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Abstract 
This paper develops a Hotelling location model in which two radio stations choose 
combinations of local and international content to play, given consumers with 
preferences distributed over those combinations.  Station revenue derives from sales 
of advertising time, the demand for which depends negatively on the price and 
positively on the station’s market share and consumers get disutility from advertising 
and from a less-than-ideal broadcast mix of local and international content.  In this 
setting we show that the laissez-faire solution involves less than (socially optimal) 
maximal differentiation.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Local content rules are essential public interest requirements for countries such as 
Australia and Canada which wish to maintain separate national cultural identities or to 
nurture national cohesion.”1  Simply substitute the appropriate country for ‘Canada’ 
or ‘Australia’ and one could find similar passages for many other countries.2  Many 
countries have expressed concerns that local culture is threatened by an international 
cultural hegemon (i.e. the U.S.), be it in film, television or music played on radio 
stations.  As a consequence, elaborate and long-lasting local content requirements 
have been implemented all over the world.  For example, the first Canadian radio 
station to broadcast regular programming – XWA/Montreal – went to air in 1919; in 
1932 the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CRBC) was established to 
regulate and control all broadcasting in Canada and provide a national broadcasting 
service, determining the number, location and power of radio stations as well as the 
time that should be devoted to national and local programming.   
Numerous rationales have been provided for such schemes – national prestige, 
merit goods, production externalities – but most usually hinge on another externality 
argument: that such schemes preserve local culture (by increasing the demand for its 
outputs) and this generates some intangible spin-off.3,4  
                                                          
1  Gareth Grainger, Deputy Chairman, Australian Broadcasting Authority, “Broadcasting, co-regulation 
and the public good”, 1999 Spry Memorial Lecture, 28 October 1999, p.39 (available at 
http://www.aba.gov.au/abanews/speeches/bcasting_info/pdfrtf/gg_spry99.rtf).  
2  Even the U.S.!  Paul Krugman writes, in a nice reversal, “[t]he same goes for cultural choices: Boston 
residents who indulge their taste for Canadian divas do undermine the prospects of local singer-
songwriters and might be collectively better off if local radio stations had some kind of cultural content 
rule.” (Slate 23/11/99 at http://slate.msn.com/id/56497/.) 
3  See Jacobsen (2000).  Of course, as Jacobsen notes, local content requirements affect supply only and 
cannot ensure that increased local programming is actually consumed, a feature we see in our model. 
4  Or tangible spin-off – such schemes are generally viewed favourably by domestic artists as they are 
seen to increase payments to such artists by increasing the demand for their outputs.  We do not 
consider this explicitly; effectively, we suppose there is free entry into music production so artists earn 
competitive returns.  Nevertheless, any supernormal returns are easily handled in our framework as a 
part of the externality that accrues from an increased audience for local content. 
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 One might anticipate a number of consequences of a cultural quota.  
Presumably it is perceived that, in its absence, consumers listen to ‘too much’ 
international content and not enough local content.5  A quota, then, might simply 
induce entry by local artists, as demand for their output increases and, to the extent 
that their entry was unprofitable before the quota, this must represent a welfare loss 
from reduced quality.6  Alternatively, programming might simply concentrate on 
domestic artists that are very similar in style and quality to those already 
programmed7 (although some schemes do not count such artists as local: see fn. 5.) 
In this paper we take rather a different approach to modelling radio 
broadcasting.  Instead of focusing on the production of local content – the artists – our 
concentration is on the medium of its dissemination.  So we do not consider the 
performing arts sector but rather focus on the impact of a cultural quota on radio 
stations and how much local content they play (and how much is heard). Taking the 
proponents of cultural quotas at face value, we suppose that there is something about 
local content that is different from the international product that is not a quality 
difference. We suppose that there is horizontal rather than vertical differentiation 
between local and international content and take this as given.8  Furthermore, we 
                                                          
5  Defined in whatever way.  The Canadian MAPL system generally requires that Canadian content 
satisfy two of the following requirements: M (music) – the music is composed entirely by a Canadian; 
A (artist) – the music is, or the lyrics are, performed principally by a Canadian; P (production) – the 
musical selection consists of a live performance that is (i) recorded wholly in Canada, or (ii) performed 
wholly in Canada and broadcast live in Canada; L (lyrics) – the lyrics are written entirely by a 
Canadian.   By this reasoning, much of the music of Krugman’s “Canadian divas” (cf. fn. 2) does not 
qualify as Canadian content.  See http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/INFO_SHT/R1.htm. See also 
Krattenmaker and Powe (1994) for a comprehensive discussion of the philosophy and practice of the 
regulation of broadcasting. 
6 Although it has been suggested that these might need only be temporary schemes – consumers are 
simply unaware of the quality of local music, film or television and, once exposed to it through a local 
content requirement, will voluntarily continue to consume it in the scheme’s absence.  On this, note 
that Canada has had local content requirements for over 40 years.   
7 This, of course, is exactly the opposite of the quota’s desired effect, encouraging domestic artists to 
become more like international ones rather than preserving any perceived cultural distinctiveness. 
8  Technically, in fact, we have aspects of both horizontal and vertical differentiation in this model. 
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allow that the hearing of local content might yield some external benefit to 
policymakers, perhaps reflecting the cultural arguments that the proponents of quotas 
claim.  Preferences for the mix of the two types of content vary across consumers, 
however, and radio stations choose their mix of content types to play in an effort to 
maximise advertising revenue.  Consumers dislike advertising (although it is socially 
desirable, as we discuss later) but advertisers attempt to reach the largest audience 
possible.  A cultural quota, then, is effectively a locational constraint on radio stations.  
Note that, while it appears that the competition between stations here is 
between characteristics of the stations themselves, rather than the programming they 
offer, in fact the locational choice is effectively a programming decision.  Our 
assumption that local and international content are different in kind can be interpreted 
as either being independent of programming genre (that is, as applying to similar-
format stations) or as applying across genres.  That is, if local content correlates with 
genres (being more concentrated in rock music than classical, say) then a cultural 
quota can be interpreted as a constraint on the genre formats of radio stations.9 
The present paper focuses on developing the model – a companion piece10 
analyses the effects of some alternative policies.  We show here that we get less than 
maximal differentiation between the stations in the absence of any quota.  The social 
optimum, sans externality, is maximal differentiation and this is also the outcome that 
would be chosen by the stations were they to collude on their locational choices.  
Our analysis is most closely related to Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (1999; 
GLS henceforth).  They model television broadcasting in much the same way as in 
                                                          
9  Indeed, some jurisdictions, such as Australia, have different content requirements across different 
formats to reflect this. 
10  Richardson (2004). 
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this paper.  But they model advertising very differently which leads to quite different 
results (such as maximal differentiation in the laissez faire solution) and their only 
policy concern is with the impact of advertising limits.  Another closely-related paper 
is that of Gal-Or and Dukes (2002) who also consider a spatial model of broadcasting 
location with broadcasters funded by informative – but nuisance – advertising, as in 
this paper.  They take a very different model of advertising, however, in which 
broadcasters and advertisers bargain over their joint surplus (which leads to a result of 
minimal differentiation across the broadcasters) and they explore no policy 
instruments.  While a number of economists have looked at radio broadcasting, 
informally discussing general issues (Coase (1966)) or formally modelling 
econometric analyses of specific aspects of the market (Berry and Waldfogel (1999a, 
1999b), Anderson and Coate (2000) and Rogers and Woodbury (1996)), none address 
the issues we analyse here.   
In the next section we set up our model before turning to an examination of 
some benchmark comparisons. Section IV then considers the laissez-faire market 
solution and Section V concludes.  
 
 
II. A MODEL 
Suppose there are two types of content, Local and that of the Rest of the world.  There 
are two radio stations and each makes a ‘locational’ choice in terms of the mix that it 
plays of these two kinds of content (for concreteness we shall henceforth talk only of 
music as the content).  We shall denote a choice of only Local content as being at a 
location 0 on the interval [0,1], à la Hotelling (1929), and a choice of only Rest of the 
world content as being at the other end of this interval at point 1.  The two stations, L 
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and R, are then described by their location along this interval and we also use the 
notation L and R to denote their locations where, without loss of generality, L≤R.  An 
important point to note is that we assume that the types of content are different in a 
horizontal rather than a vertical sense.  Local music is not assessed by all listeners to 
be inferior to the international product, or superior, but, rather, it is a matter of taste. 
 
II.1. Demand 
Consumers are distributed uniformly along this unit interval in terms of their 
preferences for mixes of the two kinds of music and have one unit of time to devote to 
listening to the radio.  An insight of GLS is that this set-up mirrors the “combinable 
products” of Anderson and Neven (1989): each consumer located between the stations 
can “roll their own” optimal mix of the two kinds of content by taking an appropriate 
convex combination of the two stations.  So if station L plays 80% local content and 
station R only 30%, for example, but consumer s prefers 50% local content, they can 
obtain that by listening to L 40% of the time and R 60% of the time.11   
 Every consumer gets utility of v from listening only to their ideal mix of music 
and we suppose this is always sufficiently high that all consumers listen to the radio: 
the market is covered.  As do GLS we assume that a consumer’s disutility from a less-
than-ideal mix of content types is increasing and quadratic in the ‘distance’ from their 
ideal mix to the mix they consume.  So a consumer located at point s consuming a 
                                                          
11  We assume that there are no switching costs involved in changing channels.  Accordingly, a 
consumer located between two channels is truly indifferent to changes in their locations (so long as 
advertising remains the same).  If there were costs to changing channels then a consumer might prefer 
fully polarised stations for reasons of convenience.  
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bundle Γs=λL+(1-λ)R gets disutility associated with a less-than-ideal product mix of 
t(Γs-s)2 where t measures the utility cost of having a less-than-ideal mix.   
Why would a consumer between L and R ever choose Γs≠s i.e. a less-than-
ideal product mix?  While the radio stations are free to listeners, we suppose that 
consumers also get disutility from advertising interrupting their programming.  If 
station j=L,R chooses to fill a fraction aj of its broadcast time in advertising then the 
advertising disutility associated with bundle Γs is τ[λaL+(1-λ)aR] where τ, 
subsequently set to unity, measures advertising disutility.12  Thus a consumer at 
location s gets total utility of u(s,λ,L,R,aL,aR)=v-t[λL+(1-λ)R-s]2-[λaL+(1-λ)aR] and 
choosing λ to minimise this yields13 the following optimal λs:   
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so that the optimal choice of content mix differs from the consumers’ ideal mix only 
to the extent that advertising differs across the two stations.  Also, from (1),  
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(3)
                                                          
12   This disutility is linear in advertising and there is no difference between advertising heard at one 
station or the other.  In this respect we have not only horizontal differentiation (in the location-specific 
disutility of a less-than-ideal music mix) but vertical differentiation in the non-location-specific 
advertising disutility. 
13   All omitted derivations are provided in a Technical Appendix available from the author. 
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where sL and sR are critical locations such that all consumers at s≤sL listen only to 
station L and all consumers with s≥sR listen only to R.  So a consumer’s mix of radio 
stations depends on her location in the following way:  
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where, to minimise notation, we let λs denote the optimal λ subject to the constraint 
λ∈[0,1].  Note that the interval sR-sL=R-L.   
 We can now calculate the total audience, xj, listening to each station j=L,R, 
given the locations and the amounts of advertising each chooses. Consider xL.  All 
consumers located with s≤sL consume only L; no consumers with s≥sR consume any 
L; and each consumer with s∈[sL,sR] spends a fraction λs of their radio time listening 
to station L.  So:  
∫∫ += R
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s
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λ  
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But s is distributed uniformly on [0,1], λs(sL)=1 and λs(sR)=0 so we get (6) (where xR 
also follows from xR=1-xL):  
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II.2. Advertising 
The role of advertising in the broadcasting literature is a controversial one.14  At one 
extreme it might be seen as purely a nuisance on aggregate: while it determines which 
products consumers favour, it has no effect on overall expenditure and advertising 
costs are a deadweight social loss resulting from a Prisoners’ Dilemma amongst 
competing advertisers.  At the other extreme it is socially useful in that it provides 
information to otherwise ignorant consumers.   
As in all models of broadcasting, the exact welfare results of our analysis will 
be sensitive to the view taken on the rationale for advertising.  The model we use here 
represents a reduced form of a model developed by Anderson and Coate (2000).  They 
consider broadcasters airing one of two programmes and consumers with a preference 
for one of two programmes.  In their model, a continuum of producers indexed by 
σ∈[0,σ] (where σ<1) sell new goods which must be advertised to make consumers 
aware of them.  When a consumer sees an advertisement for a particular product they 
are willing, with probability σ, to pay their reservation price ω for it and, with 
probability 1-σ, to pay 0; this compares to paying 0 with probability 1 if they do not 
see the advertisement.  So producers all rationally set a price of ω and, while 
advertising is socially useful (advertisers sell nothing in its absence but get positive 
expected surplus from it) it nevertheless yields no informational benefit to consumers.  
Anderson and Coate (2000) demonstrate that this model of advertising, embedded in a 
particular model of commercial broadcasting, results in a demand curve for 
advertising at a station that is decreasing in the price of advertising and increasing in 
the station’s market share.    
                                                          
14    See Anderson and Coate (2000) footnote 3 for a more complete discussion of alternative views of 
the role of advertising in economic models.  
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We think that these comparative statics – that the demand for advertising at a 
radio station decreases as its price rises but increases as the station’s audience 
increases – seem very compelling in the context of free-to-air broadcasting.  Other 
features of the Anderson and Coate model, however, do not; in particular their result 
that demand for advertising at one station is independent of whether or not the 
producer has advertised at the other station.  Similarly, the GLS vertical 
differentiation model of advertising results in demands for advertising at each station 
that do not depend at all on the rival’s advertising price.    
So our approach is simply to capture these desirable comparative statics 
effects in the simplest possible formulation of the advertisers’ problem.  We suppose 
that each radio station simply faces a competitive demand for advertising time from 
advertisers who seek to maximise some monotonic increasing function f(ajxj), j=L,R, 
of total advertising exposure: the number of consumer-minutes advertised.  This 
affects advertisers’ sales of output, which has price p.  So, as in Anderson and Coate 
(2000), advertising is potentially socially useful here15 although it yields no net gain 
to consumers.  Each advertising minute costs pj so, given this price, advertisers solve 
the following programme: 
{ } ( ) ( )
j
jj
jjjjja da
xad
fppapxafpMax
j
'  =⇒−  
(7)
It is noteworthy that, in our specification, advertisers at one station do not 
advertise at the other.  Nevertheless, we show below that they are affected by prices at 
the other station (as these affect advertising there and so the efficacy of their own 
advertising in terms of market share.)  The main rationale for this assumption is that it 
                                                          
15 Potentially only, because the gain to advertisers must be set off against the nuisance cost of 
advertising to consumers. 
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mirrors the reality of radio advertising where advertisers are very genre- and therefore 
station-specific and it can be formalised in a very simple way. 16,17  Suppose that the 
likelihood of a consumer responding to an advert for a particular product correlates 
with their preferences over music content.  That is, exposure to adverts for l-type (r-
type) products is more effective in persuading a consumer to buy those products the 
stronger is the consumer’s preference for L-type (R-type) programming. For example, 
a heavy metal enthusiast may be more (less) likely than a fan of easy listening music 
to respond to an advertisement for ear studs (golf clubs).  If there is some fixed cost to 
advertisers in constructing an advertising campaign at a station then, even if the 
degree of consumer susceptibility to adverts for different types of product varies 
continuously with preference for music type (i.e. location), an advertiser may choose 
to run a campaign at only one station.  The chosen station will be the one at which 
advertising for that product is more effective in terms of appealing to consumer types.  
As noted, casual empiricism supports the notion that radio advertisers target specific 
stations and do not tend to diversify their campaigns.18, 19 
 
II.3. Welfare 
Total welfare, W, is total consumer welfare, U, plus radio stations’ profits, plus total 
surplus accruing to advertisers at each station, SL and SR respectively, where Sj=f(ajxj)-
pjaj.  Starting with consumers, for a consumer at s≤sL disutility is t(L-s)2+aL while for 
                                                          
16  I thank the Editor for suggesting more detailed discussion of this aspect of the model. 
17  Available in the Technical Appendix.   
18  This seems less true of television advertising, at least in the context of network broadcasters, but this 
is consistent with the model outlined above: TV networks tend to be more homogeneous in their 
programming (compared to niche radio broadcasters) but it is the relative specialisation of content that 
attracts advertisers in our story.   
19 Note that we do not carry this formal model through the rest of the paper as it would complicate 
matters excessively.  In particular, policy interventions that lead the radio stations to become more 
similar, while not reducing the incentive to advertise at only one station, would lessen the attraction of 
advertising at any particular station. 
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s≥sR disutility is t(s-R)2+aR.  For a consumer at s∈[L,R] disutility is t(Γs-
s)2+{λsaL+(1-λs)aR}.  Hence,  
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( )[ ]∫
∫∫
−−−+
−Γ−−+−+−−−=
1
2
2
0
2 1
R
R
L
L
s
R
s
s
sRsLs
s
L
dsRstav
dsstaavdssLtavU λλ
 
(8)
Let A denote total advertising heard i.e.  
RRLL xaxaA +≡  
(9)
Then, substituting in for the optimal λs, we can rewrite utility: 
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Now, defining Y as (broadly) producers’ surplus, 
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where each radio station incurs a fixed operating cost of F.  Thus,  
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II.4. A restriction 
We assume henceforth a particular form of the f(.) function such that f′(.)=1 and we 
normalise p to unity.  As a consequence we can simplify total producers’ surplus as 
Y=A-2F and thus welfare becomes:  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )233 1
81
41
3
2 LRLRtRLtFvW +−−−−+−−=  (12)
This restriction warrants further comment.  Note that while the normalisation 
of p to unity is innocuous, our assumption that the marginal product for advertisers, in 
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terms of goods sales, of another unit of audience is always unity is not innocent.  
Indeed, it is the source of our result that advertising has no welfare effects in this 
model, the reason being that it means another minute of advertising in aggregate 
always increases the surplus to advertisers (the price of advertising being just a 
transfer between advertisers and the radio stations) by exactly the same amount as it 
decreases the utility of listeners, which is linear in the total amount of advertising.  As 
a consequence advertising here serves a role isomorphic to that of prices in the more 
usual Hotelling model: it is purely a transfer between consumers and firms.   
The rationale for this assumption is tractability: it is this property that enables 
the model to be solved in closed-form.  Nevertheless, it should be recognised that it 
does determine the specific nature of our welfare results; we provide some conjecture 
on their robustness in the absence of this restriction in the paper’s conclusion.  
Given this restriction, from (6) we can solve the first-order conditions in (7):  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]LRRLR
RLRLL
ppLRLRtppRLa
ppLRLRtppRLa
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+−++−=
224
3
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(13)
Note that advertising with station j=L,R decreases both with its own price and the 
price of advertising at the other station: advertising prices are strategic substitutes for 
the radio stations (in contrast to both the Anderson and Coate (2000) and GLS 
models, as noted earlier.)  The reason for this is that an increased price at one station 
discourages advertising thus increasing consumer demand and so making advertising 
at the rival station less attractive to advertisers.   
 
Cultural Quotas   
 
Page 14 
III. SOME BENCHMARKS 
III.1. The subscription case 
First, to isolate the role played in our subsequent analysis by our advertising model, 
suppose the radio stations were funded purely by subscription.20  While this is 
currently more of a reality for television than radio, nevertheless it provides a useful 
benchmark.  We consider two versions of a subscription channel.  One involves solely 
a fixed fee for subscription, independent of the amount of listening/viewing 
undertaken.  The other involves a price charged directly to consumers per-minute of 
broadcasting time consumed (pay-per-view in the context of television.) 
 In the first of these, suppose a consumer must pay a fixed fee, Pj, j=L,R to a 
station in order to receive its programming.  Assuming the market is covered (i.e. all 
consumers receive at least one station), we may again have three types of consumer: 
those who listen to only one station and those that listen to both.  For the latter, utility 
is given by u(s,λ,L,R,aL,aR)=v-t[λL+(1-λ)R-s]2-(PL+PR) and there is now no reason to 
ever choose an optimal mix that differs from s: the optimal λ is just R s
R L
λ −= −  
yielding utility of  v-(PL+PR).  This compares to v-t(s-L)2-PL when consuming only L 
and v-t(R-s)2-PR when consuming only R so we can again categorise consumers by 
their location and listening pattern: 
( )
( )
( )
only to L
Listen  to both  as ,
only to R
L R
L R
R L
s s L P t
s s s
s s R P t
 < ≡ +   ∈   > ≡ −
 
                                                          
20  I am grateful to a referee for suggesting this exercise.  
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Suppose there exists a range of consumers subscribing to both stations.  Then the total 
number of listeners at each station is xL=sR and xR=1-sL and profits of the two stations 
are simply πL=PLxL=PLsR and πR=PRxR=PR(1-sL).  Maximising these over the relevant 
price yields optimal prices in the final stage of the stations’ location and pricing game 
and evaluating sj at these prices yields sL*=⅓(2-L) and sR*=⅓R.  However, for some 
consumers to subscribe to both requires that sL*<sR* or R+L>2 which is inconsistent 
with given L≤R≤1.   That is, regardless of locations, it is always optimal for the 
stations to raise prices until consumers choose to subscribe only to one station. 
 As a consequence, our results for this case are exactly the same as those for a 
standard Hotelling model with non-combinable products.  There is a marginal 
consumer at location x defined by t(x-L)2+PL=t(R-x)2+PR and we can solve for 
optimal prices which then yield the following profit functions for the firms:  
  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1, , , 2
18
1, , , 4
18
L L R
R L R
L R P P t R L R L
L R P P t R L R L
π
π
= − + +  
= − − +  
 
(*)
Choosing locations to maximise profits then yields maximal differentiation: L=0 and 
R=1.  In this setting, however, maximal differentiation of the stations is not socially 
optimal (for the same reason that it is not socially optimal in a standard Hotelling 
model.)  The subscription fees are simply a transfer and social welfare is simply 
consumer utility less the stations’ fixed costs.  The socially optimal locations are then 
those that minimise aggregate transport costs: L=1/4 and R=3/4.   
 An alternative form of subscription station is one in which the stations charge 
by the extent of a listener’s usage – the analogue of pay-per-view television.  In this 
set-up the prices charged by the stations serve exactly the role played by advertising 
levels in our model.  Consequently, consumer demands here are exact analogues of 
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those in section II.1 but with prices replacing advertising levels: pj instead of aj.  
Station j=L,R then chooses pj to maximise πj=pjxj-F which yields price reaction 
functions and these can be solved for equilibrium prices in terms of locations alone 
yielding, in turn, market shares and profits, all as functions of locations.  Choosing 
locations simultaneously to maximise these profit functions yields the principle of 
maximal differentiation: the radio stations choose locations L=0 and R=1.  Again this 
is not socially optimal for the same reasons as in the previous subscription model.   
 
III.2. The first-best solution 
Second, returning to the model laid out in Section II, suppose a benevolent social 
planner could choose all quantities and locations.21  As noted, the level of advertising 
is irrelevant to social welfare – it washes out of (12) as it is purely a transfer from 
consumers to radio stations and advertisers.  This also implies that even if the planner 
could only choose locations the first-best could still be attained.  The first-best choice 
of locations, then, seeks solely to minimise the disutility to consumers of getting a less 
than ideal music mix and involves maximal differentiation – L=0 and R=1 – and 
yields W=v-2F.  Maximal differentiation means every consumer can construct his or 
her own ideal mix of content so there are no disutility costs at all.  What sort of music 
is played in equilibrium?  Clearly a half of all music played is local and a half is from 
the rest of the world.  This is also true of the music heard, which we denote ML: all 
                                                          
21  One might also consider a second-best solution in which the planner is subject to a non-negative 
profit constraint on the radio stations.  We ignore this constraint throughout (because it is effectively a 
condition on F that is uninteresting unless one is concerned with the pattern of entry, not the focus of 
this paper – implicitly we assume that any losses are covered by the regulator) so the second-best 
solution is of little interest here. 
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listeners get a mix of L and R for, on average, 50% local content.  So in the first-best 
we get ML=½. We summarise this all in Proposition One. 
Proposition One: Absent any externality attached to local music, first best locations 
involve maximal differentiation: L=0 and R=1, whether or not advertising levels can 
also be chosen: the level of advertising is irrelevant to welfare in the first best.  Half 
of all music heard in equilibrium is of local origin. 
 
 
IV. THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE SOLUTION 
In contrast to the previous section, suppose the planner delegates all choices of 
locations and advertising prices to the radio stations i.e. we look for the laissez-faire 
market solution. 
 
IV.1. The stations’ problem 
We seek a subgame perfect equilibrium to a 2-stage game in which radio stations first 
simultaneously choose their locations and then simultaneously set advertising prices, 
given the advertising demand of advertisers, as already discussed. 
 In the second stage, each station chooses the price to charge for advertising, 
knowing the advertisers’ consequent demands as given in (13).  For station L, for 
example, the problem is to choose pL to maximise πL=aLpL given locations and given 
(13).  That is,  
{ } ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( )RL
LLRLLp
pLRp
FpppLRLRtFpaMax
L
22
8
1
422
3
1  2L
−++=⇒
−−−++−=−=π
 
(14)
Similarly, R chooses pR to maximise πR=aRpR given locations and (13), which yields:  
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( )( )LR pLRp 248
1 −+−=  (15)
Solving the reaction functions (14) and (15) yields equilibrium prices and these in turn 
yield equilibrium advertising levels as functions of locations only.  We can then use 
these to get profits as functions of locations only.  To summarise: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) FLR
LRtRLFLRLRtRL
LRLRtRLaLRLRtRLa
LRRLpLRRLp
RL
RL
RL
−+−−=−++−=
+−−=++−=
+−=++=
22 514
1545
,54
1545
,
1028
45
,108
45
,
514
30
1,54
30
1,
ππ
 
(16)
In the first stage of the game, then, the stations choose these locations simultaneously 
knowing the subsequent prices and advertising levels that will result.  Solving for the 
equilibrium locations yields closed-form expressions for equilibrium prices, 
advertising levels and profits, denoting laissez-faire values with asterisks:  
2
1**
250
27**
25
9**
10
3**
95.0*      05.0*
==−==
====
==
RLRL
RLRL
xxFtππ
taapp
RL
 
(17)
Note that, in contrast to both GLS who demonstrate maximal differentiation and Gal-
Or and Dukes (2002) who obtain minimal differentiation, we get incomplete 
differentiation.  As with similar models (see d’Aspremont et al (1979)) there is an 
incentive here for the forward-looking stations to locate away from each other in order 
to lessen subsequent competition which shows up here in advertising levels: these 
serve the role of prices to consumers.  The difference between this model and a 
standard Hotelling model, however, is in the relationship between market share and 
profits.  In the usual Hotelling setting an increase in market share, at given prices, 
feeds directly into higher profits as the firm’s maximand is the product of price and 
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market share.  In our model, however, the effect on profit of market share is mediated 
through the price of advertising: given the level of advertising, an increased market 
share enables the firm to charge more for its advertising time.  So whereas a Hotelling 
firm in the direct analogue of this model would choose location to maximise ajxj 
directly (as aj serves the role of prices), our firm seeks to maximise ajpj where the 
first-order condition for advertisers implies that pj=d(ajxj)/daj.  As a consequence the 
losses to a firm from moving away from its rival in this model are greater than those 
from the same exercise in the more usual Hotelling setup and we get less than 
complete differentiation.  This does not stem from the combinable products aspect of 
the model (as it does not hold in the subscription version of the model, as noted) but, 
rather, from our modelling of advertising.   
Intuitively, both the radio stations’ profits and advertising are increasing in t, 
consumers’ disutility cost: as consuming a less-than-ideal mix becomes more costly 
each station has more market power. This translates into more advertising at a given 
price as the consequent marginal loss of market share is less significant the higher is t.   
What sort of music is played in equilibrium?  Again a half of all music played 
is local and a half is from the rest of the world.  This is also true of the music heard: 
5% of listeners listen only to station L and get 95% local content, 5% listen only to 
station R and get only 5% local content, and the remainder get a mix of L and R for, 
on average, 50% local content.  So in the no-intervention case we again get, as in any 
symmetric outcome, ML=½.  
 
IV.2. Welfare 
In the laissez-faire solution, from (16), we can evaluate consumers’ utility and social 
welfare directly as 4,321*
12,000
tU v= −  and FtvW 2
000,12
* −−=  respectively.  
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Diagrammatically we can portray utility as in Figure 1. All consumers suffer some 
disutility from advertising (equal at both stations).  Welfare is highest for consumers 
between sL and sR who mix both stations to get their ideal personal mixes.  Consumers 
closer to 0 (respectively 1) than L (R) listen only to L (R) but incur increasing 
(quadratic) disutility costs the more (less) local content they prefer.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
It is straightforward to show that the optimal symmetric locations are L=0 and R=1.  
If the planner were to impose this maximal differentiation but let the stations 
determine the advertising equilibrium, we would get higher profits for the stations and 
greater surplus for advertisers than in the laissez-faire solution.  But total consumer 
welfare is actually lower: even though this would yield U=v-a (so the only disutility is 
from advertising) we would have greater advertising in equilibrium than in the 
laissez-faire solution.  Indeed, consumer utility is maximised at L=R=0.5 when 
market equilibrium advertising is considered – less differentiation than in the laissez 
  v
U
 a=aL*=aR* 
 R* L*  1
  xL*   xR*
  sR 
s sL 
 U(s) 
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faire solution.   Interestingly, if the radio stations were to collude on their locations we 
would also get maximal differentiation: the socially optimal solution.   
 In contrast to the standard Hotelling model in which the laissez-faire solution 
gives more differentiation than is socially optimal, in our model we get less.  This is 
both because our social optimum is more differentiated than in Hotelling and because 
our laissez-faire outcome is less differentiated.  The former is due to the combinable 
goods: in a standard Hotelling model prices are a pure transfer and optimal locations 
are simply those that minimise total transport costs whereas with combinable products 
transport costs play less of a role in determining the social optimum.  The latter effect 
is because, as discussed, the incentive to move apart is lessened by the way in which 
market share feeds, through the demand for advertising, into the stations’ profits. 
We summarise this discussion in Proposition Two.   
Proposition Two: The laissez-faire non-cooperative solution involves less than 
maximal differentiation.  Compared to the outcome under maximal differentiation but 
with endogenous advertising – also the outcome if firms were to collude on location 
choices – the laissez-faire solution yields lower advertising, higher consumer surplus 
and lower profits to both radio stations and advertisers.  Again, half of all music 
heard is local.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has developed a model in which radio stations choose a mix of 
local and international content to play to consumers with diverse preferences, driven 
by the ability to sell advertising to advertisers seeking maximum market coverage.  In 
this setting we have shown that laissez-faire locations involve less than (socially 
optimal) maximal differentiation by the radio stations.   
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 Our exact results are, of course, special to the exact assumptions we have 
made, but we argue in Richardson (2004) that the overall thrust of them seems more 
general.  In particular, the general tenor of our comparative statics results also seems 
quite robust as they stem from the model’s Hotelling construction rather than the 
advertising model we use.  Our welfare conclusions, however, are likely to be more 
fragile.  We have maintained a restriction on the advertising side of the model 
resulting in the level of advertising having no effects on aggregate welfare, the gains 
to advertisers exactly offsetting the losses to consumers.  This is clearly significant in 
determining the attractiveness or otherwise of policy interventions.   
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